Crossroads Asia | Financial system | Central Asia
A big Uzbek delegation visited Kabul over the weekend, with commerce and transit points underneath dialogue.
The Taliban requested Uzbekistan to decrease transit charges for cargo shifting by the Central Asian nation whereas praising the bilateral relationship and airing anticipation of accelerating Afghan exports.
The subject arose in the course of the go to of a high-level Uzbek delegation to Kabul in late October.
Uzbek Deputy Prime Minister Jamshid Khojaev led a delegation to the Afghan capital on October 29-30. In keeping with reporting from Gazeta.uz, he was accompanied by Minister of Vitality Zhurabek Mirzamahmudov, Minister of Transport Ilham Makhkamov, Minister of Water Sources Shavkat Hamraev, Minister of Mining and Geology Bobir Islamov, Minister of Agriculture Ibrahim Abdurakhmonov, Particular Consultant of the President for Afghanistan Ismatulla Irgashev, and others, together with a large group of enterprise representatives.
Commerce and transit have been the top-line objects for the go to, alongside cooperation in a variety of associated sectors, together with railways, mines, water administration, and even academic alternatives in Uzbekistan for Afghans.
The Taliban facet was led by Deputy Prime Minister for Financial Affairs Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. In keeping with a Taliban government readout of the assembly, Baradar “underlined Afghanistan’s dedication to serving as a pivotal transit level within the area.”
He “praised the balanced commerce relations between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan and anticipated a big improve in Afghan exports to Uzbekistan. In mild of this, he inspired Uzbekistan to think about particular preferential tariffs and pleasant commerce interactions.”
Kun.uz reported {that a} joint working group had been fashioned to research the payment buildings in place. In keeping with feedback to Kun.uz by Uzbek Ministry of Transport press secretary Navruz Ashurmatov, an settlement was reached to arrange a working group “with the intention of evaluating the quantities of charges and funds collected from nationwide carriers on the territory of the 2 states, discussing and discovering options to present issues within the area of cargo transportation with the participation of carriers of the 2 states, [and] accountable authorities our bodies.”
For his half, per the Taliban readout, Khojaev expressed Uzbekistan’s readiness to collaborate with Afghanistan and reportedly revealed a “commerce route map” aimed toward boosting Afghanistan’s exports to Uzbekistan, “with the purpose of accelerating the commerce quantity between the 2 international locations to roughly $3 billion” from the present stage of round $600 million. Khojaev famous Uzbek plans to simplify visa procedures for Afghan entrepreneurs and drivers, in addition to plans to open a enterprise heart in Termez to cater to Afghan companies.
What’s maybe most exceptional is simply now regular relations between the Taliban and Uzbekistan are, regardless of the truth that no authorities – together with Tashkent – has formally acknowledged the Taliban regime following its ascent to energy in August 2021. That is still a technicality on the worldwide stage, one clearly not impeding cooperation throughout the border the place mutual pursuits meet.
Nonetheless, there stay factors of rivalry within the Afghanistan-Uzbekistan relationship, significantly concerning the Qosh Tepa canal. The canal goals to divert water from the Amu Darya – a transboundary river that varieties a part of Afghanistan’s northern borders with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan – and can arguably have an effect on the entire parched area. Uzbekistan is expected to dispatch a delegation by the end of the year to debate the challenge extra absolutely with the Taliban.
As Niginakhon Saida famous in a report earlier this yr, “Kabul will not be a part of any transboundary water agreements with its northern neighbors.” And in September, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, talking at an Aral Sea-focused assembly in Dushanbe, famous {that a} “new participant” within the realm of water use within the area had appeared – an indirect reference to the Taliban. Uzbekistan’s approached to the canal challenge seems measured, not dismissing the challenge altogether however clearly searching for to tug the Taliban into consultative processes concerning water sharing within the area and maybe sluggish the challenge down to totally take into account the impacts.
Uzbekistan’s issues about water might pair properly with the Taliban’s issues about transit charges, offering room for negotiation through which either side might get a few of what it needs from the opposite.
