Russia has lengthy courted Uzbekistan for membership within the Eurasian Financial Union (EAEU), a customs union comprising 5 post-Soviet states – Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia.
Moscow sees the Central Asian state’s 35 million inhabitants and rising economic system as making it a perfect addition to the bloc. Uzbekistan gained observer standing to the EAEU in 2020, and plenty of assumed that it could be the subsequent state to hitch. Nevertheless, Tashkent has since dragged its ft.
Russia resorted to sending Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin on a two-day go to in September to attempt to pace up the method, however Uzbekistan seems unimpressed.
On October 17, First Deputy Speaker of the Oliy Majlis (Uzbekistan’s parliament) Akmal Saidov said that the nation wouldn’t be becoming a member of any time quickly. “After rigorously finding out greater than a thousand totally different paperwork,” he said, “it’s within the pursuits of Uzbekistan to take care of observer standing within the EAEU.” He went on to quote the expertise of Kazakhstan, which, he claimed, “has obtained only a few advantages from becoming a member of.”
Tashkent’s reticence partly displays the truth that it has choices. In response to data from the state statistics agency for the primary quarter of 2024, Russia solely accounted for 13 % of international direct funding into Uzbekistan. China leads the best way with 23 %, whereas South Korea, Turkiye, and the UAE additionally account for substantial parts. Uzbekistan’s enchantment to international traders was highlighted lately by the curiosity of UAE agency MBS Investments in funding the Tashkent to Andijan toll street. In the meantime, with building lastly set to get underway on the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, Tashkent is hoping to see a commerce bonanza over the approaching years.
The Crocus Impact
Russia has additionally contributed to Uzbekistan’s skittishness.
In current many years, the Kremlin’s key piece of leverage over Uzbekistan has been the thousands and thousands of migrant staff who journey north to work in Russian cities. Remittances from Uzbek migrant staff were worth $16.1 billion to the Uzbek economic system in 2022, equal to some 21 % of GDP. The overwhelming majority of those remittances – 68 percent of the total – got here from Russia, and Moscow has lengthy dangled the promise of simplified entry to the Russian labor market as a prize for EAEU accession.
As a marketplace for migrant labor, Russia holds some key benefits: the visa necessities are minimal, and Uzbeks typically have a greater data of primary Russian in comparison with English.
Nevertheless, Tashkent has been making efforts to diversify, actively exploring how European Union nations may present alternatives for Uzbek migrant labor. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, on his current go to to Samarkand, signed a deal with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev designed to simplify the entry of expert Uzbek staff into Germany, notably within the well being sector.
Furthermore, wages in Uzbekistan itself are rising. Division Chief on the Company for Exterior Labor Migration of Uzbekistan Alisher Ruziev noted in June that “Uzbekistan is experiencing a building increase and, naturally, our wages are on par with some websites within the Russian Federation.” Certainly, the devaluation of the ruble, and the threat of recruitment into the Russian armed forces, noticed remittances from migrant staff fall by nearly 50 percent from 2022-23.
Russia’s enchantment has additional diminished after the extreme backlash that adopted a terrorist assault at Moscow’s Crocus Metropolis Corridor, a music venue, on March 22. The assault, which led to the deaths of 145 folks, was blamed on 4 migrants from Tajikistan. That led to widespread concentrating on inside Russia of anybody with an “oriental appearance,” together with threats to burn down Central Asian companies, boycotting non-Slavic taxi drivers, and slitting car tires.
“Individuals have progressively begun to know that our ‘older brother’ doesn’t contemplate us one of many household,” mentioned Nozim Safari, a Tashkent-based journalist, referring to Russia’s prime function among the many fraternal peoples of the Soviet Union.
On an official stage, the Russian authorities deported 93,000 folks within the first six months of this yr, 53 % greater than the identical interval in 2023. That is along with denying entry to over 143,000. The vast majority of these deportees and people turned away had been of Central Asian origin. And new legal guidelines are set to come back in subsequent yr that may further restrict the freedoms of migrants in Russia.
“If Russia’s angle in direction of our migrants doesn’t change, then in ten years we may even see fewer and fewer migrants heading north,” mentioned Safari, earlier than stressing the significance of higher relations with the West. “We want Western politicians to concentrate to the potential of Uzbek labor migrants and perceive their profit to society and the nations of the European Union. Uzbeks are very hardworking and first rate folks.”
Playing cards Left to Play
Is that this yet one more a story of a post-Soviet state drifting out of Moscow’s embrace? Maybe. However the Kremlin can nonetheless use its huge pure sources as levers in diplomatic negotiations.
Since late-2023, Russia has been selling fuel to Uzbekistan at an immense low cost. Uzbek newspaper Gazeta reported in September that the nation was paying Gazprom $160 per thousand cubic meters (tcm) for fuel, simply 55 % of the speed China paid in 2023 ($286/tcm). For reference, Western Europe typically pays between $400-500/tcm.
Gazprom’s costs are so low that Uzbekistan, regardless of having massive fuel reserves of its personal, has greater than doubled its imports from Russia, and is now a web importer of fuel. Such has been the availability glut that Tashkent has allocated $500 million to modernize previous pipelines in an try to extend the availability of Russian fuel from 9 to 32 million cubic meters per day.
Central Asia’s function as a sponge for extra Russian provide is simply prone to enhance as Europe kicks its habit, with Ukraine set to close the ultimate westbound fuel pipeline in January 2025.
This has raised fears in some quarters of the political consequences of buying fuel from Russia.
“Yearly in winter, probably the most mentioned subject in society and on social media is fuel and heating,” mentioned Safari. “Our evolution from a fuel exporter to an importer worries many. Russia has at all times tried to affect and management vitality coverage and stability within the area.
“Proper now, when Russia has nowhere to place its fuel and actually wants cash for the warfare in Ukraine, they wish to do enterprise. However politics is a fickle factor. If Russia’s doctrine modifications, the scenario might change 180 levels.”
Down However Not Out
It’s not solely pure sources which have been redirected towards Central Asia for the reason that full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Big quantities of Russian finance and human capital have additionally been channeled into these former Soviet states.
Final yr, partly for need of different locations after Western flight and visa restrictions, over 700,000 Russian vacationers visited the republic. The variety of direct flights between Russia and Uzbekistan has now reached 300 per week, whereas the Tashkent-Moscow rail route, suspended in 2020 as a result of COVID-19 pandemic, reopened in September this yr.
In the meantime Russian companies, from Yandex to Beeline, dominate key sectors of the Uzbek economic system. Tashkent has begun deepening collaboration with the EAEU’s Eurasian Improvement Financial institution, and Uzbekistan, like different Central Asian states, has benefitted from appearing as a backdoor trade route into Russia to keep away from sanctions.
Like each different state within the area, Uzbekistan is hedging its bets on the result of the Ukraine warfare whereas maximizing alternatives elsewhere. Key to this might be Uzbekistan’s accession to the World Commerce Group (WTO).
Tashkent started the applying course of three many years in the past, however has solely lately started undertaking the reforms which might be mandatory for membership. Mirziyoyev signed a decree on June 3 detailing the measures that Uzbekistan was planning to take so as to guarantee WTO accession by 2026. These ranged from bringing customs duties according to WTO requirements to considerably liberalizing Uzbekistan’s media surroundings.
In October he went additional, stressing the need to speed up these reforms.
Whether or not WTO membership alone presents a long-term technique for holding the Russian wolf from the door is one other subject totally, however it’s definitely considered because the precedence in Tashkent. For now, EAEU membership is off the desk, and that in itself is considered as an achievement by some.
As Safari put it, “We should perceive how tough it’s to attain this refusal within the circumstances of such a tricky and intrusive associate.”
