Earlier this week, the Institute for Technique and Coverage-Myanmar, a Yangon-based think-tank, revealed its regular report on the state of the nation’s battle. The report contained a complete evaluation of the overland commerce between Myanmar and its neighbors, and the extent to which this has been affected by the nation’s intensifying civil warfare.
For the navy’s State Administration Council (SAC) the report would possible make for grim, although maybe not stunning, studying. Among the many numerous statistics continued within the ISP-Myanmar report was the outstanding conclusion that ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) against the navy at the moment are in charge of commerce routes liable for practically all the nation’s overland commerce with China.
Because the report states, of the 17 official border commerce stations between Myanmar and its 5 neighbors – India, China, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Laos – resistance teams now management 5: three bordering China (Muse, Chinshwehaw, and Lwegel), one bordering Thailand (Mese), and one bordering India (Rihkhawdar).
Of the 5 border crossings with China, Muse and Chinshwehaw have been taken by the Three Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armed teams through the preliminary part of its Operation 1027 offensive in northern Shan State late final yr, and Lwegel was overrun by the Kachin Independence Military in April. By taking these stations, the ISP-Myanmar identified, these EAOs have come to manage commerce routes that accounted for a whopping 91 p.c of the worth of the border commerce between China and Myanmar within the three years following the 2021 coup.
These losses are mirrored within the SAC’s own latest data exhibiting a 41 p.c decline within the complete overland commerce with China between April 1 and July 19, in comparison with the identical interval in 2023. These figures additionally present that commerce on the Muse border crossing fell by $371 million, or 46 p.c. Even then, the $411 million in commerce quantity recorded at Muse from April 1 to July 19 was made up principally of exports of natural gas by way of the pipelines working into China. As soon as that is taken out of the equation, it’s possible that merchandise commerce has principally come to an finish. SAC information additionally exhibits commerce at Chinshwehaw and Lwegel dropping to nothing.
The ISP-Myanmar report additionally notes that the SAC now has full management “over solely one of many six commerce routes connecting these 5 border commerce stations.” An important of those, the Northern Shan commerce route connecting Mandalay with the Chinese language border, “appears to have come to an entire halt” because the launch of Operation 1027. The ISP-Myanmar report features a map exhibiting that the SAC solely has full management of a small portion of the freeway between Pyin Oo Lwin and Nawnghkio; the remaining is below the management of the members of the Three Brotherhood Alliance and their allies.
Even border crossings that aren’t but below the resistance’s management have seen dramatic commerce declines because of the safety state of affairs. Border commerce with Bangladesh via the Sittwe and Maungdaw stations, nonetheless below navy management, has come to a halt amid the continued battle with the Arakan Military. The Tamu station on the Indian border in Sagaing Area likewise can “solely function minimal commerce as a result of conflicts and hardships en route.”
In the meantime, commerce on the Myawaddy border crossing between Thailand and Myanmar has collapsed since late final yr, when EAOs and Individuals’s Protection Forces got here near seizing the city. Whereas Myawaddy is now below the management of a Border Guard Drive previously allied to the junta, ISP-Myanmar said that “the Myawaddy-Kawkareik Asian Freeway continues to be not in use.”
In keeping with SAC data, commerce quantity over the Myawaddy crossing plummeted by 87 p.c from $556 million in April 1-July 19 final yr to only $71 million in the identical interval in 2024, a part of a 53 p.c decline within the complete overland commerce between the 2 nations. On the Htee Khee border station in Tanintharyi Area, commerce volumes fell by 55 p.c; right here, too, many of the $570 million in exports recorded for the most recent quarter was made up of pure fuel exports to Thailand.
One of many outcomes of this has been to exacerbate the unlawful commerce that has lengthy flourished round Myanmar’s borders. ISP-Myanmar quoted estimates suggesting that “unlawful commerce now accounts for about 80 p.c of border commerce, with authorized commerce solely round 20 p.c.” (Beforehand, the proportion was reversed.)
In keeping with ISP-Myanmar, the junta has tried to offset the lack of practically all overland commerce with China by opening a brand new commerce route via jap Shan State, by way of the city of Kengtung, the house of the Myanmar navy’s Triangle Area Command, to Thailand and Laos, and – by way of the Mekong River – to China. Whereas this passage is a part of a longstanding regional connectivity project, and has been considered as an essential future commerce route, its realization “seems questionable if the continued battle within the jap and southern Shan States extends additional.”
In any occasion, this route is lengthier and significantly extra pricey than these in northern Shan State. Likewise, on the Thai border, options to the Myawaddy border commerce path to the north and south require that “smaller vehicles have to be used to move smaller consignments of products as a substitute of enormous vehicles.” Moreover, “numerous armed teams additionally impose taxes alongside the route.” To assist offset the lack of overland commerce, the junta has additionally tried to extend cargo shipments by air from southern China, however that is additionally vastly extra pricey.
Whereas overland commerce solely accounts for round 1 / 4 of the commerce that Myanmar’s junta has carried out because the 2021 coup, in line with ISP-Myanmar, the collapse of this commerce provides as much as a bleak prognosis for the SAC. Layered on prime of the runaway inflation within the worth of the kyat, that is more likely to put additional upward strain on the value of fundamental items, resulting in better privation and elevated discontent with the generals.
On the opposite facet, it stays unclear whether or not and to what extent EAOs will profit from the management of border commerce with China. Angered on the launch of the second part of Operation 1027 in June, which marked the ultimate collapse of a China-brokered ceasefire settlement designed partly to permit the resumption of commerce, Beijing has shut the border crossings managed by the Three Brotherhood Alliance. Its official resumption is barely more likely to happen within the context of a brand new ceasefire association between the Alliance and its allies and the Myanmar navy, which, with the latter now poised to launch contemporary assaults into central Myanmar, seems to be a way off.
If commerce does at some stage resume, it might present a supply of earnings for EAOs, strengthening their positions in Shan and Kachin states and making it much less possible for the navy to have the ability to reverse its current losses. Whether or not all of this consigns the navy junta to a gradual financial loss of life, or whether or not it may possibly give you sufficient financial workarounds to maintain itself for the long run – by way of smuggling or different commerce routes via these few areas nonetheless below its steady management – shall be put to the check within the coming months.
